5.10 Matej Pivoluska - Encryption with Weakly Random Keys Using Quantum Ciphertext

Weakly Random Keys Using Quantum Ciphertext

Matej Pivoluska, FI MUNI


Lack of perfect randomness can cause significant problems

in securing communication between two parties. McInnes and Pinkas

proved that unconditionally secure encryption is impossible when

the key is sampled from a weak random source. The adversary

can always gain some information about the plaintext,

regardless of the cryptosystem design.

Most notably, adversary can obtain full information

about the plaintext if only two bits of the source are

fixed (if the key is sampled from a distribution on n-bits,

for which the probability of each element is bounded from above by

1/(2^(n-2)).

In this paper we show that for every weak random

source there is a cryptosystem with a classical plaintext,

a classical key, and a quantum ciphertext that bounds the

adversary's probability to guess correctly the plaintext

strictly under the McInnes-Pinkas bound, except for a

single case, where it coincides with the bound. In

addition, regardless of the source of randomness, the

adversary's probability p is strictly smaller than 1 as

long as there is some uncertainty in the key

(Shannon/min-entropy is non-zero). These results

demonstrate that quantum information processing can solve

cryptographic tasks with strictly higher security than

classical information processing.